5.18.2004

Enron scandal explained

by Dr. Mary Harris

By Geri Lynn Utter | Published: Thursday, February 7, 2002

"The ultimate cause of Enron Corporation's brutal collapse was a culture of greed and arrogance that bred excessive secrecy," competitors and lawyers interviewed by Kurt Eichenwald of the New York Times said. Due to the alleged white-collar crime causing the fall of Enron Corporation, one of the world's largest energy traders, Congress has been forced to reevaluate the business ethics of the entire nation. Critics and members of Congress charge that Enron Corporation managed to violate basic accounting procedures and committed white-collar crime, that have not only effected its employees and shareholders, but its political status with the country.

"Dec. 2 Enron Corporation filed for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which is a form of bankruptcy that allows the company to operate while attempting to redeem itself," Dr. Mary Harris, assistant professor of finance, said. A Chapter 11 bankruptcy may not seem extremely detrimental to many businesses, but in Enron's situation it is a matter of $1.2 billion of debt and losses that were kept off the books, hidden in separate investment partnerships.

Investment partnerships can be best described as separate businesses that were partially owned by Enron Corporation; however, Enron failed to report the debt and losses of these small investment partnerships on the books because Enron did not claim to own more than half of these companies. According to a basic accounting principle, known as the Owner of Partnership, if a company/person (Enron) owns less than 50-percent of a company (investment partnerships) the loss and debt of that company does not have to be reported on the books. It was later discovered that Enron did have ownership in more than half of these so-called investment partnerships. What Enron essentially did, according to accusations from 1997 to 2000 was report all the investment partnerships revenue (gain) and disregarded their losses.

Arthur Anderson, a Big Five Accounting firm, is currently being investigated for signing financial statements and reports that contained false information involving the loss and gain of Enron's investment partnerships.

"As an accounting major seeking my CPA certification, it has been driven into me that the only companies worth working for are the Big Five Accounting Firms," Lisa Simonetti, a senior accounting major, said. "An occurrence such as Enron filing Chapter 11 shows how large firms are blinded by the almighty dollar, anything to make a buck. Enron should not have attempted to keep separate investment partnerships off the books, and Arthur Anderson should have had the ethical standing to refuse approval of financial statements."

Aside from charges of breaching accounting ethics, Enron also has been met head-on with three different charges of white-collar crime. The first charge brought against Enron is Security Fraud. Enron is accused with failing to give correct copies of a 10K report to potential investors and shareholders. A 10K is a financial report that shows the share-worth (earnings per-share), net income and the overall growth or decline of the corporation. The second charge brought against Enron is referred to as insider trading. Former Enron officers have been accused of making $1 billion in Enron stock before officially declaring bankruptcy. In plain terms, Enron executives sold their stock for $1 billion dollars before Enron stock value plunged by keeping their financial status under their hats. The final criminal charge brought against Enron is tax fraud. This offense is usually used when dealing with tax evasion. Enron has allegedly been charged with Federal Bank Fraud, which involves lending information between Enron and the said bank.

Even though Enron has officially declared a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, former Enron employees appear to be financially suffering the most. Enron employees invested much of their savings in Enron stock, which now is worthless. People lost much of their life savings for retirement.

When dealing with a typical 401K plan, it is standard procedure that an employee makes a contribution to his retirement plan that his place of employment usually matches in stock. Enron only supplied their employees with an equal contribution in Enron stock. Under legit circumstances, it is the duty of the employing company to supply its employees with diverse stock options; however, Enron stock was the only stock offered to Enron employees. For the most part, Enron employees were happy with their 401K plans because Enron stock was growing.

When Enron executives discovered that the financial collapse of their company was inevitable they put a "lock-out" on employee stock, which stopped employees from trading Enron. This "lock-out" forced employees to lose half of their retirement pension because of the company's failure.

It has been established that Enron has played a major role in dramatically disrupting the lives of its' employees and shareholders, but it has also displayed a negative effect from a political standpoint.

Prior to Enron's collapse, Enron representatives met Vice President Dick Cheney on several occasions to discuss new energy policy. Enron was a major contributor to politicians. Enron gave $1 million to President Bush and contributed heavily to many members of Congress. This is the same Congress that is now investigating Enron.

Two months after one of the world's largest energy traders, Enron Corporation, declared bankruptcy, 20,000 people are out of jobs and out of much of their retirement pension. Kenneth L. Lay, CEO of Enron, has refused to appear before Congress because he feels as though he has already been convicted of the crimes brought against him and another former Enron officer was found dead in his home last week of an alleged suicide.

5.03.2004

New 25 European Union Countries

UK
Ireland
Denmark
Belgium
France
Germany
Switzerland
Spain
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Austria
Luxemburg
Sweden
Finland
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia

Discovering Profits in Timing Funds

A Student's Tip Aided Professor in Research Into Trading Strategy
By AARON LUCCHETTI
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
May 3, 2004; Page R1

So just who was the first to discover that there were bundles of money to be made in the rapid trading of mutual-fund shares?

It wasn't Eliot Spitzer, even though the New York attorney general grabbed the headlines eight months ago for exposing that the activity was hurting long-term mutual-fund investors. Nor was it Edward J. Stern, the hedge-fund manager who in September was the first to settle charges by Mr. Spitzer involving the rapid-trading strategy often called market timing.

To get to the roots of the earliest fund market timing, a good place to start is with a less well-known figure -- David Dubofsky, a professor at Virginia Commonwealth University. Sixteen years ago when he worked at Texas A&M University, a student told Mr. Dubofsky about the potential for mutual funds to be gamed through market-timing strategies. That tip -- passed along in the midst of the stock-market crash of 1987 -- set the professor on a course that has now put him in the middle of the largest investigation into mutual-fund wrongdoing in the $7.5 trillion industry's history.

Last week, Janus Capital Group Inc. became the latest firm agreeing to a settlement with federal and state regulators over charges that it allowed sophisticated traders to buy and sell its fund shares at the expense of buy-and-hold shareholders. With Janus's $226 million settlement, the fund industry now has agreed to pay about $2 billion in penalties, restitution and fund-fee reductions as well as jettisoning numerous top executives in connection with the scandal.

For the vast majority of the 91 million fund investors in the U.S., the industry's regulators, and fund-company employees themselves, discovery of the trading abuses couldn't have come as a bigger shock. The fund industry was long held out as a model of good conduct not susceptible to the types of scandals that have often plagued other parts of Wall Street.

But a small group of academics had been pointing out the potential problems with market-timing strategies for years. Since the late 1990s, more than a dozen finance professors at numerous universities have done research to document how market timing works and how it hurts mutual-fund investors. Prompted more by academic curiosity and professional competition than by investor advocacy, the researchers working alone or in small teams wrote at least eight papers on the topic. All were published or widely circulated well before questions about the fund-timing issues attracted Mr. Spitzer's attention beginning last summer.

Yet, unlike an investment scandal in the mid-1990s, when a pair of academics got credit for exposing trading problems on the Nasdaq Stock Market that eventually led to a landmark antitrust case against Wall Street dealers, the professors writing on fund timing even now haven't gotten much of the credit for exposing the trading abuses. To be sure, the mutual-fund research studies didn't document the surprising degree to which fund companies were secretly agreeing to accommodate market timing in their funds. But the papers did identify the basic arbitrage opportunities that attracted hedge funds and other sophisticated investors to see easy profits in mutual funds in the first place.

Looking at market-timing research being circulated in 2000 and 2001 caused the Securities and Exchange Commission's staff to "focus on the issue" of market timing, leading it to clarify to the industry steps that funds could take to deter the practice, says Paul Roye, head of the SEC's Division of Investment Management. But what the SEC staff didn't know -- and, of course, what wasn't detailed in the research papers -- was how widespread the practice was and that "there were funds cutting deals" with market timers to enable their rapid trades, he adds.

Digging Into the Secrets of Fund Market Timing

Some of the professors who have produced research papers on mutual-fund market timing and their universities when the papers were published.

AUTHOR(S) PAPER
David Dubofsky, Virginia Commonwealth; Rahul Bhargava, University of Nevada, Reno; and Ann Bose, Texas A&M "Exploiting International Stock Market Correlations With Open-End International Mutual Funds"
Roger Edelen, Wharton; John Chalmers, University of Oregon; and Gregory Kadlec, Virginia Tech "On the Perils of Financial Intermediaries Setting Security Prices: The Mutual Fund Wild Card Option"
Eric Zitzewitz, Stanford "Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds"
Jason Greene, Georgia State; Charles Hodges, State University of West Georgia "The Dilution Impact of Daily Fund Flows on Open-End Mutual Funds"
William Goetzmann, Yale; Zoran Ivkovich, University of Illinois; and Geert Rouwenhorst, Yale "Day Trading International Mutual Funds: Evidence and Policy Solutions"

As they started to unravel those deals, Mr. Spitzer's investigators also turned to the earlier work of the academics. One study by Prof. Eric Zitzewitz of Stanford University in California received enormous attention after Mr. Spitzer cited its estimate that investors in international mutual funds could lose 1% to 2% of their assets a year because of the rapid trading.

Among the academics, however, Mr. Dubofsky's story is unique. For one thing, his paper on market timing is recognized as the first to be published. More recently, he has benefited from some good timing himself, which allowed him to become more closely involved than any other academic in helping regulators decide how the fund cases should be handled.

A native of Brooklyn in New York City, Mr. Dubofsky in 1981 took a job teaching at Texas A&M and got his doctorate in finance from the University of Washington the following year. The soft-spoken teacher's primary interest was looking into how investors could manage risk by using complex financial instruments called derivatives.

Mr. Dubofksy's interest in mutual funds perked up after he got a curious lead from graduate student Glenn Rasmussen in 1987. Mr. Rasmussen had saved some money from jobs working in the oil business and decided to invest the bulk of it in international-stock mutual funds.

Mr. Rasmussen liked international funds because he felt they diversified his U.S. real-estate holdings. But a few years before, he also had found a way to juice up his profits from international funds by trading shares in those portfolios on days when the U.S. stock market moved sharply.

It was easy money because of a quirk in the way fund companies priced international funds. Investors like Mr. Rasmussen could place an order to buy or sell fund shares until 4 p.m. Eastern time, but the funds' share price was determined using the closing prices on securities traded in Europe or Asia, determined hours earlier. So if the U.S. stock market took a plunge after the Asian and European markets had closed, that move wouldn't be factored into the funds' net asset value, even though there was a good chance that Asian and European stocks would follow the U.S. market in the next day's trading.

Mr. Rasmussen got an opportunity to illustrate this point to his professor on Oct. 19, 1987, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average suffered its largest one-day fall ever in percentage terms. With coverage of the market crash dominating the TV in the Texas A&M business-school building, Mr. Rasmussen explained to Mr. Dubofsky that he'd be able to save several thousand dollars by immediately selling his shares of GT Global Pacific Growth Fund, whose price didn't yet reflect the sharp drop in the U.S. stock market.

Being able to make such profitable moves was like seeing "a train at the end of the tunnel" and having "enough time to move off the track," says Mr. Rasmussen.

Mr. Dubofsky wondered if such tricks could be used to add profits to international-fund strategies more broadly. In the mid-1990s, as international funds continued to grow in popularity, he and two doctoral students started working on a paper to explore the question. The three found that investors who traded funds like Mr. Rasmussen could add eight percentage points a year in returns if they picked their spots correctly. They also called on the fund industry to change its pricing procedures to cut down on the opportunity for rapid traders to arbitrage profits away from long-term fund shareholders.

The paper -- relatively short for academia at nine pages -- didn't get much notice. One prestigious financial journal declined to publish it, and it ended up appearing in a smaller journal.

Mr. Dubofsky moved to Richmond, Va., in 1997 to take a professor's job at Virginia Commonwealth. The same year, something happened that greatly increased interest among researchers across the country in fund-trading issues. In late October 1997, when the Asian and U.S. stock markets were gyrating wildly, the largest U.S. fund firm, Fidelity Investments, used estimates to update foreign prices for some of its funds to prevent traders from quickly profiting off international time-zone arbitrage strategies.

The move, called fair-value pricing, prompted scrutiny from the SEC and complaints from traders. Academics were also drawn to the growing controversy. Within three years, 16 professors from 11 universities were toiling away on seven more papers on market timing. Many kept their work secret and didn't learn about others' efforts until they appeared on academic Web sites.

"We dropped everything else," says Gregory Kadlec, a professor from Virginia Tech in Blacksburg who for months spent several hours a day discussing a market-timing paper with his co-authors. One reason the pressure was especially high was that there were so many papers trying to get into a handful of publications.

At one point a few years ago, Georgia State University's Jason Greene called Roger Edelen, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School at the time, to ask whether Mr. Edelen would look over a paper on market timing that Mr. Greene was trying to finish.

Mr. Edelen was stunned.

"Wait a second," he interrupted. "We're wrapping up a draft of what sounds like the same paper."

SEC officials, hearing about the research papers, started to press for more information. They invited Mr. Edelen and another professor working on the issue, Geert Rouwenhorst of Yale University, New Haven, Conn., to present their new papers on fund timing to the agency.

The SEC followed up the presentations with a letter to the industry encouraging fund companies to use the kind of fair-value pricing that Fidelity used. But many professors and others say the agency should have given more specific guidance on when to use fair-value pricing. And despite the letter, not many fund companies seemed to be using fair-value pricing with any regularity.

Meanwhile, when Mr. Dubofsky jointly wrote a second paper on market timing in 2001, he and co-author Rahul Bhargava from the University of Nevada at Reno got several dozen calls from interested parties asking for copies of the study. But the calls didn't come from regulators -- they came from sophisticated investors who wanted learn more about how to trade mutual funds.

"I viewed [market timing] as a relatively evil strategy," recalls Mr. Dubofsky. "I was wondering why there wasn't more emphasis on it" by regulators.

In April 2003, Mr. Dubofsky got a break that was even bigger than it first appeared. He was chosen to work for a year in 2004 as a visiting academic at the SEC. Economists that he was slated to work with were interested in his mutual-fund studies, but it didn't seem like those would be a big priority since his work on derivatives was also heating up.

Everything changed on Sept. 3, when Mr. Spitzer touched off an industry-wide investigation of market timing in mutual funds with a settlement involving Mr. Stern's Canary Capital Partners hedge fund. Mr. Stern, who didn't admit nor deny wrongdoing, agreed to pay $40 million to settle the civil charges. The gaggle of professors who had published papers raced to television cameras, to panel discussions, and to start working on more papers examining fund issues.

The fund investigation also leapt to the top of the priority list at the SEC, giving Mr. Dubofsky, now 54 years old, more influence than he ever imagined he would have in the mutual-fund world. Since joining the SEC in January, Mr. Dubofsky has studied funds' trading data to identify which portfolios might be the biggest targets of market-timing activity.

He has also worked on quantifying the monetary damages suffered by investors in funds involved in some of the SEC's biggest fund settlements, including Putnam Investments, Alliance Capital Management Holding LP and Massachusetts Financial Services Co.

"A year ago, I thought I'd come and work on this sleepy research topic," Mr. Dubofsky says of his mutual-fund timing work. "But it's become a lot more important."

Write to Aaron Lucchetti at aaron.lucchetti@wsj.com

Finding Lessons Of Outsourcing In 4 Historical Tales

Technology, Trade, Migration Often Shook Job Market; Politics Can Slow Effects
Farmers Fall Prey to Railroads By BOB DAVIS

What could be a more modern dilemma? High-speed data links allow employers to ship white-collar jobs from rich countries to India, China and other nations where workers earn far less.

Yet losing skilled jobs to low-wage foreign competition is as old as the Industrial Revolution. In the 1830s, the British textile industry became so efficient that Indian cloth makers couldn't compete. The work was outsourced to England, with disastrous consequences for Indian workers. "The misery hardly finds parallel in the history of commerce," India's governor general, William Bentinck, wrote to his superiors in London in 1834.

As Americans grapple with the fallout of shipping hundreds of thousands of jobs overseas, history echoes with many similar episodes -- and lessons. Trade and technology can boost living standards for many people, by creating lower-priced goods. But those same forces can destroy skilled jobs that workers thought never would be threatened.

Competition from foreign labor hurt huge classes of American workers in the 19th century but eventually helped ease wage disparities between nations. And during these upheavals, history shows that politics can arrest what seems like unstoppable technological progress.

Here are four lessons from history that help illuminate today's debate:

Even high-skilled, good-paying jobs are vulnerable.

In the early 1800s, skilled weavers in Britain who worked on hand looms considered themselves a protected class. For a while, the government banned the use of textile machinery that could do weaving more efficiently and even barred emigration by mechanics as a way to keep technology bottled up in Britain.

A rioting mob of Luddites, the 19th-century British workers opposed to the mechanization of factory jobs, depicted in an 1813 illustration by Hablot Knight Browne

Disgusted by factories, with their 14-hour days and six-day weeks, artisans prized their independence. They sometimes worked four-day weeks. When offered higher prices for their cloth, they often chose to work less rather than produce more, writes Harvard University historian David Landes.

But eventually, factories prevailed. Steam-powered weaving machines were five times as efficient as hand-powered ones.

In 1811 and 1812, bands of skilled weavers -- who took the name "Luddites," after a mythical protestor Ned Ludd -- raided factories and smashed hundreds of weaving machines. The Luddites, who saw themselves as heirs to Robin Hood, captivated the poet Lord Byron, who wrote, "Down with all kings but King Ludd." It took 14,000 British soldiers to quell the rebellion, says Kirkpatrick Sale, a historian of the Luddite movement.

The Luddites, often seen as a symbol of futility, were the first of a series of resistors to technology. The Homestead strike of 1892 -- in which seven Pennsylvania steel workers and three Pinkerton detectives were killed -- was sparked by Andrew Carnegie's efforts to automate steel production. In the 1960s, U.S. union protests over "de-skilling" -- replacing machinists with automated tools -- ended peacefully with unions accepting no-layoff pledges in exchange for new technology.

Today, computer technology is moving such skilled jobs as software design and architectural engineering overseas. "There is no job that is America's God-given right anymore," Carly Fiorina, Hewlett-Packard Co.'s chief executive, said at a recent press conference in Washington. "We have to compete, over time, for jobs as a nation."

Trade liberalization often works with technology to undermine powerful interests.

After the Luddite rebellion was crushed, British industrialists lobbied to repeal agricultural tariffs, known as the Corn Laws, to open the country to imported wheat. (In Britain, "corn" was a synonym for grain.)

Those tariffs benefited farmers and the landed gentry in England, by propping up property values. But they hurt manufacturers who had to pay more for land and workers who had to pay more for bread.

In an echo of warnings made today about the dislocations caused by trade, economist Thomas Malthus wrote in 1815 that if the Corn Laws were repealed "the transfer of wealth and population [away from agriculture] will be slow, painful and unfavorable to happiness."

Trying to show a common bond with nascent unions, industrialists dubbed the tariffs a "bread tax." Laborers were suspicious, especially since bosses in the 1830s opposed proposals to limit workdays to 10 hours.

The landed gentry lost in the end. The Irish potato famine of 1845 persuaded British lawmakers to repeal the agricultural tariffs, allowing grain to be imported. Bread prices fell, and the British economy, especially manufacturers and financiers, prospered during an era of free trade.

Labor advocates accused factory owners of using lower import prices as justification for wage cuts, foreshadowing decades of similar fights. Marxist theoretician Friedrich Engels wrote in 1881: "There were plenty (of industrialists) ... who did not even try to disguise their opinion that cheap bread was wanted simply to bring down the money rate of wages."

Gregory Clark, an economic historian at the University of California at Davis said British factory wages were flat for the first decade after the Corn Law repeal. But workers' living standards improved, he says, because their food bills declined.

Today, the same forces are at work. Lower tariffs make it easy for China to export clothing and electronics to the U.S., battering workers in those industries. But overall, many Americans benefit because the imported goods drive down prices.

Domestic workers are always vulnerable to competition from foreigners willing to work for less.

Today, technology lets employers tap low-cost labor by shipping jobs overseas. In the past, the low-cost labor came to America in waves of immigration.

The effect on wages is similar: Millions of domestic workers compete with foreigners for jobs, and pay disparities start to narrow.

The scale of competition was more intense in the late 19th century. Between 1870 and 1910, 60 million Europeans, mostly young males with few job skills, emigrated to the U.S., Canada, Australia and Argentina. This boosted the labor force in the U.S. by 24%, and in Argentina by a staggering 86%. It reduced the ranks of the European labor force, by 45% in Ireland and 39% in Italy, according to Harvard economist Jeffrey Williamson and University of Essex economist Timothy Hatton.

The massive increase of workers sent industrial wages tumbling in the U.S. In New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and other cities, wages declined between 1% and 1.5% for every 1% increase in immigration during the 1890s and early 1900s, says Harvard economist Claudia Goldin. Wages dropped even more steeply in fields dominated by immigrants, such as sewing-machine operators.

ECONOMIC ECHOES

Fights over trade, technology and immigration foreshadowed today's debate over outsourcing jobs overseas.

• 1811: Luddite rebellion against mechanization of the wool industry.

• 1846: Britain's "Corn Laws" repealed, spurring grain imports, which reduced bread prices.

• 1869: U.S. transcontinental railroad completed, boosting exports.

• 1870-1913: Mass migration from Europe to America; some U.S. factory wages decline.

• 1879: Germany raises tariffs to limit agricultural and steel imports.

• 1897: American Federation of Labor backs literacy requirements for immigrants.

• 1914: World War I starts, tearing apart world trade system.

• 1921: Emergency Quota Act ends mass immigration.

• 1930: Smoot-Hawley tariff passes, deepening barriers to trade.

U.S. labor unions turned against immigration in the 1890s. The American Federation of Labor supported literacy requirements for immigrants in 1897. The measure failed to pass Congress by only two votes. (Immigrants would have been required to read part of the U.S. Constitution in their native language.) In New York City, an independent Labor Party urged a tax of $100 per new entrant. On the West Coast, AFL organizers led anti-Asian immigrant movements.

With fewer workers competing for jobs, the historically low wages in Europe rose. Europe's vast wage disparities with other countries began to diminish. In 1870, wages were 136% higher in the U.S. and other New World countries than in Europe, according to Professors Williamson and Hatton. By 1913, the gap had closed by half. By the time the U.S. firmly barred the door to immigration in 1921, the flood of new arrivals was easing anyway because European wages had risen so much.

Wages in India and China, even if rising, are still far from U.S. levels. For instance, Intel Corp., the Silicon Valley semiconductor giant, estimates that its labor rates in India are one-third U.S. levels. This cost advantage will likely last for decades. The history of immigrations suggests that if outsourcing spreads, the wages of U.S. workers who compete with Indians and Chinese will suffer.

Salaries of U.S. computer programmers, whose work has been outsourced abroad for more than a decade, were flat between 2000 and 2002, after inflation, according to Jacob Kirkegaard, a researcher at the Institute for International Economics, a Washington think tank. The number of U.S. programming jobs declined about 14%, he says. However, he adds that it's hard to distinguish between the effect of outsourcing and the burst of the high-tech bubble of the late 1990s.

But the size of a workers' paycheck isn't the only measure of economic well-being. The prices he or she pays is another. Just as the import of goods reduces the prices Americans pay for computers and cars, so will the import of services, many contend. If U.S. hospitals send more X-rays to India for radiologists there to read, or pharmaceutical companies use more Indians to conduct clinical trials, American workers and employers could benefit if health-care costs decline.

Politics can slow down the transforming effects of new technology.

The transportation revolution of the late 19th century was every bit as life-changing as the advent of the Internet and high-speed data communications today. Railroads carried goods across the U.S., Canada and Australia to ports, where they were loaded on fast steam ships for transit across the ocean. The cost of shipping wheat between New York and Liverpool fell by half between 1830 and 1880, and by half again from 1880 to 1914, according to New York University historian Niall Ferguson.

Technology created new markets and new industries. Refrigerated rail cars created a national meat-packing industry in the U.S. and made Chicago a magnet for slaughterhouses. Department stores and mail-order catalogs grew in the late 1880s, dependent on railroads for deliveries.

The pace of life quickened. "The train is leaving the station" became part of the vernacular. A writer for Scribner's in 1888 said life had changed more in the past 75 years than at any time since Julius Caesar "and the change has chiefly been made by railways."

The forces of technology and trade seemed unstoppable. But they weren't. Politics trumped technology in ways that are instructive for today.

The new economy of that day destroyed jobs, industries and whole towns. Local meatpacking plants closed, as did ice houses and small general stores. Steamboat towns such as Burlington, Iowa, and St. Louis faded, and farmers regretted their dependence on railroad barons, says historian Richard John of the University of Illinois at Chicago. "There is a screw loose," complained a farm journal editor in the 1890s. "The railroads have never been so prosperous, and yet agriculture languishes."

Trade opened new markets for American grains. But it battered cotton farmers, whose goods were undercut by Egyptian and Indian cotton. Exports of cotton yarn and cloth from Japan took markets from U.S. exporters. The Southern Manufacturers Club, in Charlotte, N.C., debated the "Oriental question" -- cheap imports from China and Japan -- in 1901.

Industries and workers hurt by imports assembled coalitions that persuaded politicians to erect high tariffs. In the U.S., the Republican Party became the home of protectionism. In 1892, William McKinley -- then governor of Ohio and later president -- attacked free trade for destroying "the domestic product representing our higher and better-paid labor." Skilled workers were attracted to the cause, and the U.S. remained a high-tariff country for much of the early 20th century.

In Germany the political reaction was more radical. Prussian Junkers, the land-owning elite who dominated the military, made common cause with industrialists to push trade barriers higher -- and keep them there. In what became known as the "marriage of rye and iron," Junkers pressed for high agricultural tariffs to keep out American wheat, while industrialists lobbied for industrials tariffs to block British steel imports. The result: German militarism and economic isolationism mounted.

Today, political reaction against outsourcing abroad is in the early stages. State legislatures are discussing barring companies that shift work abroad from receiving government contracts. Congress is discussing regulation and tax policy to hinder the practice. History shows that in a battle between politics and technology-driven change, betting on technology isn't a sure thing.

Write to Bob Davis at bob.davis@wsj.com5